Introduction
The EU financial deregulation process constituted a major structural change that altered the competitive environment of the European banking system. As banking market structures become more liberalised, it is expected that these changes would feed through into competition, efficiency gains and productivity improvements for banks (Molyneux and Williams, 2005) . The issue of productivity measurement is long debated. Following Nishimizu and Page (1982) , total factor productivity change is decomposed into technological progress (the rate of change of the best practice frontier) and technical efficiency change (learning-by-doing, improved managerial practice as firms attempt to catch-up with industry best practice). A remaining question is how best to estimate productivity change.
Whilst productivity change can be determined by parametric and non-parametric methods (Odeck, 2007, and Casu et al, 2004 provide comparisons of estimated productivity growth derived from frontier methods and data envelopment analysis), the non-parametric Malmquist productivity index is used in several applications in banking (see Guzmán and Reverte, 2007) . A drawback of the Malmquist approach is that it requires a choice to be made between an output or input perspective, which depends on the assumption of either revenue maximisation or cost minimisation at sample firms but not profit maximisation (Boussemart et al, 2003) . This limiting assumption does not hold if productivity change is estimated using the Luenberger productivity indicator, which is a difference-based indicator as opposed to ratiobased like the Malmquist. 1 In its favour, the Luenberger indicator can account for output expansion and input contraction whilst assuming that sample firms maximise 1 For further elaboration on productivity measurement by ratios (indexes) and differences (indicators), see Chambers (1996 Chambers ( , 2002 and Diewert (2000 Diewert ( , 2005 . profit. Evidence shows that ratio-based productivity indexes overestimate productivity change compared to productivity indicators (Briec and Kerstens, 2004; Boussemart et al, 2003 Boussemart et al, , 2006 .
We apply the Luenberger indicator to estimate productivity change in the European savings banks sector between 1996 and 2003. 2 Various implications for public policy arise from the productivity performance of savings banks (Williams, 2004) . There is the need to establish if the deregulation model is achieving its intended effects on savings banks, which, typically, are small-sized banks serving local retail banking customers, and whose ownership rights are often ambiguous implying that the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control is absent. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 synthesises the salient literature. The methodology is detailed in Section 3. Section 4 presents the data and the results whilst some conclusions are offered in Section 5.
2 So far as we are aware, there is one other application of the Luenberger productivity indicator in banking (see Park and Weber, 2006 for a study of productivity growth in Korean banks). 3 The role of savings banks varies across countries: in the EU savings banks account for roughly 25% of non-bank customer deposits, 50% in Spain and around 40% in Germany (as at January 2006). Schure et al (2004) report considerable heterogeneity in cross-border inefficiencies. Single country studies tend to examine if bank organisational form explains efficiency differences.
Evidence from Germany, where there is a large public-owned savings banks sector, implies the results are inconclusive (Altunbas et al, 2001 ). (Maudos et al, 1996) .
European banks, in general, are realising productivity improvements, although the rate of growth varies across countries, possibly reflecting differences in the pace of banking sector consolidation (see Dietsch and Weill, 2000; Casu et al, 2004; Molyneux and Williams, 2005) . This contrasts with evidence from the US that suggests productivity growth is limited (see Bauer et al, 1993; Humphrey and Pulley, 1997; Stiroh, 2000; Alam, 2001; Berger and Mester, 2003) . US evidence finds a positive relationship between financial deregulation and profit productivity but the opposite for cost productivity (Berger and Mester, 2003) . In Europe, the evidence is mixed: Kumbhakar et al (2001) and Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas (2005) find deregulation led to productivity growth in the Spanish savings banks sector but the opposite is reported by Griffel-Tatjé and Lovell (1997) . This is attributed to differences in the specification of banks' output vectors.
In order to identify the sources of productivity change in the European savings banks sectors in six EU countries between 1990 and 1998, Williams (2001) savings banks (Dietsch and Weill, 2000; Kumbhakar et al, 2001 ) and banks in general in Spain (Guzmán and Reverte, 2007) . Chambers et al (1996 Chambers et al ( , 1998 propose more flexible measures of firm performance deriving from production theory. They introduced the "directional distance function", which is the transposition in production theory of Luenberger's "benefit function" in a consumer context (see Luenberger, 1992) . This function determines a distance in one direction which permits an observed production unit to reach the production frontier. In economic terms, the function makes it possible to evaluate the economies which can be achieved, and the possible improvements in production; it also provides a "benchmark" by defining a reference point to be reached. The principal advantage of this function lies in its ability to take account simultaneously, and in a broader context, of both inputs and outputs. The directional distance function, therefore, measures the largest changes in inputs and outputs in a given direction which are necessary for a firm to reach the production frontier.
Let the technology be described by a set,
where
+ is a vector of inputs and
+ is a vector of outputs at the time period t for the bank k.
Throughout this paper, technology satisfies the following conventional assumptions:
i.e., no free lunch; 
, i.e., fewer outputs can always be produced with more inputs, and inversely (strong disposal of inputs and outputs); A5:
The directional distance function generalizes the traditional Shephard (1970) distance function. Directional distance functions project input and output vectors from themselves to the technology frontier in a pre-assigned direction. In the case of a radial direction out of the origin, we retrieve the classical Shephard distance function. The directional distance function is defined as follows:
The function
defined by
is called directional distance function in the direction of
To operate the approach, it is necessary to take an appropriate direction. We do this by considering the direction ) , ( y x g = . Then, the directional distance function is similar to the proportional distance function of Briec (1997) . This distance function is based on simultaneous proportional modifications of inputs and outputs; it generalizes the Debreu and Farrell measures and is straightforward to interpret. [ ]
Positive growth (decline) is indicated by positive (negative) value. Unlike the Malmquist index, the Luenberger productivity indicator is additively decomposed: Färe et al, 1989) .
Structural efficiency and aggregation
In an aggregate context, and following Farrell (1957) and Briec et al (2003), we use an aggregate directional distance function constructed as:
This aggregate efficiency indicator is referred to as a structural efficiency indicator, and the aggregate Luenberger productivity indicator (AL) is constructed as follows:
Equation (7) allows similar decompositions to equation (5). Farrell (1957) was the first to propose the concept of "structural efficiency" to measure the overall efficiency of an industry (as a group of firms). In a radial context, he suggested that it can be measured by the weighted average (by output) of the efficiency scores of individual units. Along this line, several studies clarify and develop a framework for the measurement of structural efficiency (see, for instance, Førsund and Hjalmarsson, 1979; Färe, Grosskopf, and Li, 1992; Li and Ng, 1995;  5 See Färe and Primont (2003) and Färe and Grosskopf (2004) for discussion of the aggregation of the Luenberger productivity indicator. Färe and Zelenyuk, 2003; Li and Cheng, 2007) . The different developments are based on the fact that the group of firms has an identical technology, which is a common assumption in efficiency analysis.
In a directional distance function framework, the aggregation of efficiency measures is investigated by Briec et al (2003) and Färe and Grosskopf (2004) . However, these authors do not study fully the specific case of structural efficiency, and especially how the aggregate technology is constructed according to the returns to scale. To overcome this problem and define our aggregate technology, we follow Briec and
Peypoch (2004) and show the equivalence between structural and industrial efficiency by employing Koopmans (1957) theorem.
The resource directional distance function proposed by Briec and Peypoch (2004) is the transposition in a production context of the resource function introduced by Luenberger (1996) in order to analyse the consumer's welfare from an aggregate viewpoint.
The resource directional distance function
where the production choice for a group of banks j (at the country level in our case) Guironnet and Peypoch (2007) for an empirical contribution using this measure. In words, the aggregation that takes place here is exactly the same as discussed by Koopmans (1957) .
To estimate each aggregate efficiency indicator, we use a non-parametric approach (see Banker and Maindiratta, 1988; Varian, 1984) . The technology can be written as:
. (9) The aggregate indicator requires the calculation of the aggregate technology and allows us to compare the banks of a country with the set of all banks of all countries.
The linear program that calculates the values of the aggregate directional distance function is given by
Note that the constraint = Table 1 for the distribution of sample data). Table 1 here
We construct aggregate efficiency and productivity measures for saving banks in each country. To model the bank production process, we employ the intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977) which assumes that bank liabilities are transformed into earning assets.
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Banks are assumed to produce four outputs that cover both on and off-balance sheet activities: (i) total customer loans, (ii) interbank loans, (iii) securities, and (iv) off-balance-sheet items.
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Two inputs are used to produce bank output: (v) fixed assets and (vi) variable cost (defined as the sum of interest expense, personnel cost, and other non-interest income expense). The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 2 . There are several approaches to modelling the bank production process: the production approach, user-cost approach, value added approach and dual approach (see Berger and Humphrey, 1992) . 9 Our choice of bank output is consistent with the established literature. This is important because the definition and measurement of output could significantly affect the level of bank efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997) . (Williams, 2001 ). This implies that savings banks are achieving productivity growth across the current period of EU financial deregulation. Consistent also with evidence on savings banks (Williams, 2001; Maudos et al, 1996) , our results confirm technical change (at 2.74 percent) is the main source of productivity growth. Our technical change estimate is slightly lower than the 3.4 percent per annum reported for the sector between 1989 and 1997 (Carbo et al, 2003) and for European banks between 1989 and 1996 of 3.6 percent per annum (Altunbas et al, 2001 ). Nevertheless, the result implies that the benefits of savings banks' technology sharing arrangements extend across all banks. The results show there is a limited contribution made to productivity growth by efficiency change (0.323 percent). However, efficiency change is contributing, which contrasts with earlier evidence (Williams, 2001 ).
This study reports cross-country estimates of productivity change for savings banks sectors. So far as we are aware, this is the first study to estimate productivity change and its decomposition for the European savings banks sector. As might be expected, the results displayed in Table 3 exhibit cross-country heterogeneity. Productivity growth is highest in Finland (4.53 percent), Spain (4.488 percent) and France (4.223
percent) yet negative in Germany (-1.688 percent). 
Conclusion
We employ the Luenberger productivity indicator rather than commonly applied non-parametric indexes for two reasons. Indexes overestimate productivity change relative to difference-based indicators like the Luenberger. The assumption that sample firms maximise profits is accommodated by the Luenberger indicator. Our application is to the savings banks sectors in ten EU countries from 1996 to 2003. The results show that the average savings bank achieved annualised productivity growth of 2.79 percent over the period. This rate of growth is consistent with previous findings for savings banks drawn from parametric models (Williams, 2001) .
With regard to public policy, our results suggest that financial deregulation is positively associated with bank productivity growth, which confirms earlier evidence from Spain (Kumbhakar et al, 2001; Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005) ; the US (Berger and Mester, 2001) ; and some EU savings banks sectors (Williams, 2001 ).
The implication is that EU financial deregulation has lowered production costs, which translated into cost savings that have been reflected in productivity growth.
The main source of productivity growth for savings banks is technical change, which confirms other findings for savings banks (Williams, 2001 ) and European banks (Casu et al, 2004) . The productivity-driving role of technical change is all the more important given there is minimal evidence that suggests savings banks are catching up with best practice. Possible reasons for this finding include the absence of a disciplining market for corporate control, and possible agency problems arising from public and/or mutual ownership. Whilst this would concern bank regulators, it may be partially offset by the fact that productivity growth can be used to support capitalisation of non-joint stock savings banks. 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
